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a b s t r a c t
We consider a class of perfect information bargaining games with unanimity acceptance rule. The
proposer and the order of responding players are determined by the state that evolves stochastically over
time. The probability distribution of the state in the next period is determined jointly by the current state
and the identity of the playerwho rejected the current proposal. This protocol encompasses a vast number
of special cases studied in the literature. We show that subgame perfect equilibria in pure stationary
strategies need not exist. When such equilibria do exist, they may exhibit delay. Limit equilibria as the
players become infinitely patient need not be unique.
© 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
In his seminal paper, Rubinstein (1982) studies the division of
a surplus among two impatient players through a non-cooperative
bargaining game. Following this contribution, a rich literature has
emerged which extends and generalizes Rubinstein’s approach.
A number of general results have persistently and recurrently
emerged from this literature: in bargaining games where a surplus
is divided under unanimity rule, equilibria exist, are efficient, and
converge to a weighted Nash bargaining solution in the limit. In
this paper, we explore the boundaries of the scope under which
these general results are valid.
We consider bargaining games with the following character-
istics. There is a finite number of players who need to make a
unanimous choice for one particular payoff vector within a full-
dimensional set of feasible payoffs. The game is set in discrete time
and in each round of the game, one player is selected as the pro-
poser. His role is to suggest one particular feasible payoff vector.
The other players then sequentially accept or reject this proposal
in some fixed order. If all players agree to the proposal, the game
ends and the agreed upon payoffs are realized. As soon as one of
the players rejects the current proposal, the game proceeds to the
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0304-4068/© 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.next round. We assume an exogenous breakdown of the negotia-
tion to occur after each disagreement with probability 1−δ. Time-
discounting and the possibility of an exogenous breakdown are
largely interchangeable interpretations of δ. The term ‘‘bargaining
friction’’ can be used to capture both of them. The importance of
the bargaining friction lies in the fact that it creates an incentive to
come to an agreement sooner rather than later.
In order to complete the description of a unanimity bargaining
game, one has to specify a rule which determines which player
is the proposer in what round. We will refer to this rule as the
protocol in the sequel. Rubinstein (1982) studies a game with
only two players who simply take turns in making proposals,
the alternating offer protocol. Rubinstein finds a unique subgame
perfect equilibrium. The equilibrium strategies happen to be
stationary.
It is well-known that the uniqueness of subgame perfect equi-
librium breaks down in unanimity bargaining games with more
than two players. With regard to those games, the literature fo-
cuses on subgame perfect equilibrium in pure stationary strate-
gies (SSPE), which allow sharp predictions of the equilibrium
payoffs at least when the discount factor is sufficiently close to
one. Arguably the most obvious generalization of Rubinstein’s al-
ternating offer protocol to the case with more than two players is
the rotating protocol, under which players become proposers in
ascending order, and the first player proposes again after the last
player. One alternative proper generalization of the alternating of-
fers protocol is the rejector-proposes protocol introduced in Sel-
ten (1981) in a coalitional bargaining set-up. Under that rule, the
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poser. The rejector-proposes protocol is an example of an endoge-
nous protocol inwhich the actions taken by the players throughout
the game have an influence on the proposer selection. One impor-
tant example of a protocol which is not a proper generalization of
Rubinstein’s alternating offers protocol is the time-invariant prob-
ability protocol which consists of an exogenously given probability
distribution from which the proposer is drawn in each round.
The literature on unanimity bargaining games has established
some results that are generally valid no matter which of these
protocols is assumed.
1. An SSPE exists.
2. Every SSPE has no delay.
3. Every SSPE has efficient proposals.
4. There is a unique limit equilibrium as δ approaches one.
5. All limit equilibrium proposals are equal to a weighted Nash
bargaining solution.
The aforementioned results follow from Britz et al. (2010) for
exogenous protocols and from Britz et al. (2014) for endogenous
protocols. They extend earlier work for more specific protocols
by Binmore et al. (1986), Hart and Mas-Colell (1996), Kultti and
Vartiainen (2010), Laruelle and Valenciano (2008), and Miyakawa
(2008).
The weights in the Nash bargaining solution corresponding
to the limit equilibrium proposals depend on the distribution of
bargaining power inherent in the protocol. Kultti and Vartiainen
(2010) show that the weights are all equal to each other under the
rotating protocol. Miyakawa (2008) and Laruelle and Valenciano
(2008) study the time-invariant probability protocol. In this case,
the vector of bargaining weights is given by the time-invariant
probability distribution. Britz et al. (2010) study a protocol where
the selection of the proposer is described by aMarkov process. That
is, there are n probability distributions on the n players. The iden-
tity of the proposer in the current round determines which of the
probability distributions is used to draw the proposer in the fol-
lowing round. This Markovian protocol is both a generalization of
the time-invariant probability protocol and the rotating protocol.
Then, the vector of bargaining weights is given by the stationary
distribution of the Markov process.
Britz et al. (2014) study a class of endogenous protocols, thereby
covering the rejector-proposes protocol. They consider protocols
which consist of n probability distributions on the n players. The
identity of the player who rejects the current proposal determines
which of those probability distributions will be used to draw the
following proposer. The vector of bargaining weights is shown
to be proportional to the vector of probabilities with which the
players propose after their own rejections.
In this paper, we present a class of unanimity bargaining
games that allows for a rich family of bargaining protocols. This is
achieved by introducing a finite set of states and for each state, con-
ditional on the identity of the rejecting player, a vector of transition
probabilities to the new states. The state determines the identity of
the proposer and the order of the responses. It is easily verified that
all the aforementioned protocols follow as special cases. The mod-
eling approach is closely related to the one of Merlo and Wilson
(1995).We aremore general in allowing for endogenous protocols,
i.e. the vector of transition probabilities may depend on the iden-
tity of the rejecting player. Motivated by our desire to study the
effects of the bargaining protocol itself, we are less general in not
allowing for the set of feasible payoffs to depend on the state.
We demonstrate that the results of the bargaining literature as
enumerated above do not generalize, evenwhenwe require the set
of feasible payoffs to correspond to the division of a unit surplus.
We construct an example with three players and three states. A
player is the proposer in his own state and the states correspondingto Players 2 and 3 are absorbing. Once Player 2 or Player 3 is
selected as the proposer, he will remain the proposer forever. In
state 1, the protocol follows the rejector-proposes protocol after
rejections by Players 2 or 3. In the example, any SSPE predicts
delay. SSPE proposals need not be efficient. In the example there
is a continuum of SSPEs. Since the example is valid for arbitrarily
high values of δ, it is then used to show that limit equilibria are not
unique, that there are two accumulation points of limit equilibrium
utilities, and that limit equilibrium proposals may not be equal to
each other. We show that the example is robust to perturbations
of the transition probabilities.
The main intuition behind the example is that Players 2 and 3
capture the entire surplus in their own state. Since the protocol is
of the rejector-proposes type in state 1, an SSPE with immediate
acceptance requires Player 1 to offer both of them at least δ. Since
the total surplus is equal to one, this is clearly infeasible when δ
is above one half. All SSPEs are therefore such that the offer by
Player 1 in state 1 is rejected by one of the other players.
Yildiz (2003) studies the role of optimism in explaining
bargaining delay. He has an example which is similar to ours in the
sense that each of the responding players has a continuation payoff
of δ, so that immediate agreement is impossible when δ exceeds
one half. In the example by Yildiz (2003), however, this result is
driven by the fact that due to optimism each player believes that he
will become the proposer in the next round with probability one.
These beliefs are incompatible and therefore at least one player is
wrong about the protocol. In contrast, the delay in our example
is derived in a set-up where the bargaining protocol is common
knowledge among the players.
Finally, we modify our leading example in a simple way. In
state 1, we use the rejector-proposes protocol for Players 2 and
3 with probability one half and assume that Player 1 remains the
proposer with the complementary probability. We demonstrate
that now both SSPEs with immediate agreement and SSPEs with
delay fail to exist. Herings and Predtetchinski (2015) have shown
for the time-invariant probability protocol that an SSPE exists even
when the set of feasible payoffs is non-convex. It follows that
variations in the protocol are more problematic for fundamental
properties like existence and efficiency of an SSPE than variations
in the set of feasible payoffs.
Our results complement some of the examples of equilibrium
delay and non-existence found in the literature. An example of an
SSPE exhibiting delay has been given in Chatterjee et al. (1993)
in the context of coalitional bargaining. Unlike the unanimity
bargaining games considered here, in coalitional bargaining games
a proposing player may choose to make an offer to a subset of
the players. The approval of the proposal by all players in the
chosen coalition is then sufficient for the proposal to pass. Also
in a coalitional bargaining context, Bloch (1996) shows that SSPEs
need not exist. Merlo and Wilson (1995) show that an SSPE may
exhibit delay if the size of the cake changes stochastically over
time. Jéhiel andMoldovanu (1995) show that delay can arise due to
externalities. In addition to these examples, where delay arises in a
complete and perfect information framework, there is a literature
on bargaining delays when the parties are asymmetrically
informed, see for instance the review by Ausubel et al. (2002).
The plan of the paper is as follows. We start by formally de-
scribing a class of unanimity bargaining games in Section 2. Sec-
tion 3 summarizes the results in the literature regarding existence,
immediate agreement, efficiency, and limit equilibria. Section 4
presents the example where an SSPE predicts delay, inefficiency,
and non-uniqueness of the limit equilibrium. Section 5 shows the
example to be robust to perturbations in the transition probabil-
ities. We show in Section 6 that an SSPE may even fail to exist
all together and Section 7 show this example to be robust to per-
turbations in the transition probabilities. Section 8 discusses the
extension of the analysis to coalitional bargaining and Section 9
concludes.
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We consider a non-cooperative bargaining game G(N, V , S,
ι, p0, p, δ), where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players and V ⊂ Rn
is the set of feasible payoffs. Bargaining takes place in discrete time
t = 0, 1, . . . . In each round, one player is selected as the proposer
and proposes an element v of V . Next, the players sequentially
respond to the proposal and, in case of unanimous acceptance, the
proposal is implemented and the game ends with payoffs v to the
players. As soon as one player rejects, the game breaks down with
probability 1− δ and continues to the next round with probability
δ ∈ (0, 1). In case of breakdown, as well as in case of perpetual
disagreement, payoffs to all players are equal to zero.
Our emphasis will be on the role of the protocol in determining
the bargaining outcome. The set of feasible payoffs V is therefore
kept fixed in each round, but the bargaining protocol is allowed to
be quite general. To achieve this, wemake use of a finite state space
S. The function ι : S → N×Π , whereΠ is the set of permutations
on N , assigns to each state a proposer and an order of responders.
That is, if ι(s) = (i, π), then Player i is the proposer in state s
and all players sequentially respond to the proposal in the order
π(1), . . . , π(n) given by the permutation π .
In round t = 0, the initial state is determined by the proba-
bility distribution p0 ∈ ∆(S), where ∆(S) is the set of probability
distributions on S. In any round t > 0, the state of the game is
determined by transition functions pj : S → ∆(S), one for each
Player j ∈ N . If Player j ∈ N rejects the proposal at time t when
the game is in state s, then pj(s) returns the probability distribu-
tion fromwhich the state at time t+ 1 is drawn conditional on the
continuation of the negotiations.
Many protocols that have been studied in the bargaining
literature are special cases of the class of protocols described above,
up to relatively unimportant modeling details. Such modeling
details concern whether there is some probability of breakdown
of negotiations, or whether players have time preferences. In
case time preferences take the discounted utility form, although
conceptually different from the risk preferences that are needed
to study models with breakdown, both approaches lead to the
same results as argued in Binmore et al. (1986). Another issue
is whether players vote simultaneously or sequentially. Under
simultaneous voting, the solution concept of subgame perfection
has less bite and on top of subgame perfection it is typically
required that players use stage-undominated voting strategies
to avoid coordination problems. We study sequential voting in
this paper. A final modeling detail is that we formally allow the
proposer to turn down his own proposal.
The alternating offer protocol studied in the seminal contribu-
tion of Rubinstein (1982) corresponds to the case where S = N =
{1, 2}, Player s is the proposer in state s, and state transitions are
such that the state alternates betweenperiods. Player 1 is the initial
proposer. Kultti and Vartiainen (2010) consider a multilateral ex-
tension of alternating offer bargaining, where proposers rotate in
making offers. Their model corresponds to the case where S = N ,
Player s is the proposer in state s, and the state transition is to state
s+ 1 modulo nwith probability 1 if the current state is s. Binmore
(1987) and Banks and Duggan (2000) consider the time-invariant
probability protocol. This protocol results when S = N and there
is a fixed probability distribution p0 on S such that the proposer is
selected in accordance with p0 in every time period. Kalandrakis
(2004) and Britz et al. (2010) consider the case where S = N and
require that for all j, k ∈ N, pj = pk. For s ∈ S, it holds that
ι(s) = (s, π0), where π0 is the identity. The state denotes the cur-
rent proposer and Player i responds before Player j if and only if
i < j. State transitions are not influenced by the identity of the
rejecting player, but are otherwise general, so this Markovian pro-
tocol includes the rotating protocol and the time-invariant proba-
bility protocol as special cases. Merlo and Wilson (1995) considera general state space S and assume that for all j, k ∈ N, pj = pk.
They allow the set of feasible payoffs to depend on the state s, but
since our attention here is on the influence of the protocol on the
allocation of payoffs, we consider a fixed set V instead.
All the bargaining protocols described in the previous para-
graph have in common that the actions taken by the players are
without consequence for theway the bargaining protocol proceeds
in case of a rejection, i.e. for all j, k ∈ N it holds that pj = pk. We
refer to these protocols as exogenous.
The rejector-proposes protocol is introduced in Selten (1981)
in a coalitional bargaining set-up and specifies that the player
who rejects the current proposal is automatically called upon to
make the next proposal. Kawamori (2008) generalizes this protocol
to allow for a general probabilistic selection of a new proposer,
conditional on who rejects the current proposal. When we apply
his coalitional bargaining model to our unanimity bargaining set-
up, we obtain the case where S = N , for s ∈ S it holds that
ι(s) = (s, π0), where π0 is some fixed permutation of the players,
and for all s, s′ ∈ S, pj(s) = pj(s′).
Whenever for some j, k ∈ N, pj ≠ pk, the actions of the players
influence the way the bargaining protocol proceeds, and we refer
to such protocols as endogenous protocols. The rejector-proposes
protocol is a key example of an endogenous protocol.
The state space S can be used tomodel muchmore complicated
protocols. For instance, a state could incorporate some finite
history of past proposers or some finite history of past rejectors.
3. Results in the existing literature
Multilateral bargaining games are known to admit a wide
multiplicity of subgame perfect equilibria, see Herrero (1985)
and Haller (1986). It is therefore common in the literature to
restrict attention to subgame perfect equilibria in pure stationary
strategies. Although ideally the notion of stationarity should follow
endogenously from the specification of the game as in Maskin
and Tirole (2001), the literature typically takes the more ad hoc
approach described below, which in general is weaker than the
stationarity notion of Maskin and Tirole (2001).
A pure stationary strategy for Player i in the game G(δ) consists,
for each state s ∈ S such that ι(s) = (i, π) for some π ∈ Π , of
a proposal θ s ∈ V and, for each state s ∈ S, of an acceptance
set Ai,s ⊂ V . A stationary strategy of a player specifies a unique
action for each of his decision nodes. This action depends only on
the state and not on any other aspect of the history if the player
is a proposer and on the state as well as the proposal made if the
player is a responder. A stationary strategy profile (θ, A) leads to
a unique probability distribution over payoffs in V , so determines
the utility ui(θ, A) of Player i ∈ N . Conditional utilities are denoted
by ui(θ, A | s). The social acceptance set in state s ∈ S is defined as
As =i∈N Ai,s. The social acceptance set consists of all alternatives
that are unanimously accepted when proposed in state s.
Definition 3.1. A stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE)
is a profile of pure stationary strategies that is a subgame perfect
equilibrium of the game.
Wewould like to emphasize that since an SSPE is a subgameperfect
equilibrium, no player has a profitable deviation from it, where a
deviation is allowed to be non-stationary.
We make the following standard assumptions on V , where we
use the notation V+ = V ∩Rn+ and ∂V+ for the set of weakly Pareto
efficient points in V+. Moreover, a vector η with ∥η∥ = 1 is said to
be normal to the set V at a point v¯ ∈ V if (v − v¯)⊤η ≤ 0 for every
v ∈ V . The set of all vectors η normal to V at v¯ is called the normal
to V at v¯.
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from below. The origin lies in the interior of V . The set V+ is
bounded and all points in ∂V+ are strongly Pareto efficient. There
is a unique vector in the normal to V at every v ∈ ∂V+.
A stationary strategy profile (θ, A) is said to have no delay if for
every s ∈ S it holds that θ s ∈ As. A stationary strategy profile (θ, A)
is said to have efficient proposals if for every s ∈ S it holds that
θ s ∈ ∂V+.
Apart from the analysis of G(δ), the literature also typically
studies the behavior of equilibria when the continuation probabil-
ity δ tends to 1.
Definition 3.2. The profile of proposals θ¯ = (θ¯ s)s∈S is a limit equi-
librium if there is a sequence {δm}m∈N of continuation probabilities
in [0, 1) converging to 1 and a sequence of profiles {θ(δm)}m∈N =
{(θ s(δm)s∈S)}m∈N, where θ(δm) is an SSPE profile of proposals of the
game G(δm), such that limm→∞ θ(δm) = θ¯ .
A limit equilibrium is a profile of proposals that can be
approximated arbitrarily close by an SSPE profile of proposals
when the probability of breakdown is arbitrarily small. Of
particular interest is the relationship between limit equilibria and
the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution with positive weights
µ ∈ Rn+ \ {0}, denoted µ-ANBS and defined as follows.
Definition 3.3. The asymmetric Nash product with weights µ ∈
Rn+ \ {0} is the function f : V+ → R defined by
f (v) =

i∈N
(vi)
µi .
The µ-ANBS is the unique maximizer of the function f on the set
V+.
Britz et al. (2010) study the class of exogenous protocols
characterized by the following assumption.
Assumption B. It holds that S = N , for every s ∈ S, ι(s) = (s, π0)
with π0 the identity, for all j, k ∈ N, pj = pk, and the matrix
M = [pj(1) · · · pj(n)] is irreducible.
An irreducible matrix M has a unique stationary distribution µ.
Recall that a stationary distribution µ is a probability distribution
on the set of states satisfying Mµ = µ. The Markovian protocols
satisfying Assumption B are sufficiently rich to encompass the
alternating offer protocol, the rotating protocol, and the time-
invariant probability protocol.
Britz et al. (2014) study the class of endogenous protocols
characterized by the following assumption.
Assumption C. It holds that S = N , for every s ∈ S, ι(s) = (s, π0)
with π0 the identity, for every j ∈ N , for every s, s′ ∈ S, pj(s) =
pj(s′). There exists i ∈ N such that pii(i) > 0.
In Britz et al. (2014), the authors assume for the sake of
simplicity that players respond to a proposal in the fixed order
1, . . . , n. As remarked in footnote 6 of that paper, all results would
carry over to the case with arbitrary voting orders. We would like
to emphasize that thematrixM ′ = [p1(s) · · · pn(s)] is not assumed
to be irreducible. The only requirement made in Assumption C is
that it has at least one non-zero diagonal element.
We associate to each protocol satisfying Assumption C the
weights µ > 0 given by µj = pjj(j), j ∈ N , so µj is the probability
that Player j becomes the next proposer conditional on a rejection.
The class of protocols satisfying Assumption C corresponds to
the class studied in Kawamori (2008) and includes the rejector-
proposes protocol as a special case.
The following result follows from Britz et al. (2010, 2014).Theorem 3.4. If Assumptions A and B, or Assumptions A and C are
satisfied, then
1. An SSPE exists.
2. Every SSPE has no delay.
3. Every SSPE has efficient proposals.
4. There is a unique limit equilibrium.
5. All limit equilibrium proposals are equal to the µ-ANBS.
The characterization of limit equilibrium proposals as a
weighted Nash bargaining solution has been shown in Binmore
et al. (1986) for bilateral bargaining. For multilateral bargaining,
this result is obtained in Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) for the
time-invariant probability protocol with uniform recognition
probabilities and in Miyakawa (2008) and Laruelle and Valenciano
(2008) for general recognition probabilities. Kultti and Vartiainen
(2010) derive this result for the rotating offer protocol. Theorem3.4
includes these results as special cases. The five claims of
Theorem 3.4 and in particular the limit equilibrium payoffs are
independent of the order in which the responding players accept
or reject the proposal. This is noteworthy in the case of an
endogenous protocol. For instance, one might have conjectured
that the rejector-proposes protocol favors the player who comes
first in the responder order.
Ideally one would like to prove Theorem 3.4 for the entire
class of bargaining protocols as laid down in Section 2, up to
standard regularity assumptions on the set of feasible payoffs as
in Assumption A and under appropriate regularity assumptions
on the protocol that generalize Assumptions B and C to the set-
up of this paper. Assumption D presents a strong version of such
regularity assumptions.
Assumption D. For every i ∈ N , there exists s ∈ S andπ ∈ Π such
that ι(s) = (i, π). For every s, s′ ∈ S, for every i ∈ N, pis′(s) > 0.
The first part of the assumption says that every player is the pro-
poser in some state. The second part says that for every player, for
every pair of states, there is positive probability that the player be-
comes the proposer in one state if he rejects a proposal in the other
state. For the model with S = N and rejector-independent tran-
sition probabilities, Assumption D implies Assumption B. For the
model with S = N and state-independent transition probabilities,
Assumption D implies Assumption C. In view of Theorem 3.4, one
could then conjecture that the five results stated in Theorem 3.4
hold in our model if Assumptions A and D are satisfied. However,
we will show in the sequel that this is not true. In particular, in
Proposition 5.3, wewill show that a bargaining protocol can satisfy
Assumption D but still violate the no delay and efficient proposals
properties of Theorem 3.4.
4. Failure of Properties 2, 3, 4, and 5
In this section, we present an example where Properties 2, 3,
4, and 5 of Theorem 3.4 are violated. Moreover, the example is
minimal in the following sense: It has S = N = {1, 2, 3}, and for
two states out of three we have pj(s) = pk(s), for all j, k ∈ N .
With the exception of one state, the protocol therefore satisfies
Assumption B and is exogenous.
Example 4.1. There are three players and three states, S = N =
{1, 2, 3}. Each player is the proposer in one state and players
respond in ascending order, so we have
ι(1) = (1, π0),
ι(2) = (2, π0),
ι(3) = (3, π0),
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unit, V = {v ∈ R3|v1 + v2 + v3 ≤ 1}. This set clearly satisfies
Assumption A. In state s = 1, we follow the rejector-proposes
protocol for Players 2 and 3. If Player 1 rejects his own proposal
in state s = 1, then each of the three states is selected next with
equal probability.
p1(1) =

1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3

,
p2(1) = (0, 1, 0),
p3(1) = (0, 0, 1).
States s = 2, 3 are absorbing.
pi(2) = (0, 1, 0), i ∈ N,
pi(3) = (0, 0, 1), i ∈ N. 
The next result claims not only that equilibria may exhibit
delay, but evenmakes the stronger statement that all SSPEs feature
delay for sufficiently high values of δ.
Proposition 4.2. For δ > 1/2, every SSPE in Example 4.1 has delay.
Proof. Suppose by way of contradiction that (θ, A) is an SSPE
which has no delay. Consider a subgame startingwith a proposal by
Player 2 in state 2. In this subgame, Player 2 remains the proposer
forever, and it is straightforward to verify that the subgame has a
unique SSPE where Player 2 captures the entire surplus. It holds
that u(θ, A | 2) = (0, 1, 0). By a completely symmetric argument,
we find that u(θ, A | 3) = (0, 0, 1). Now consider a subgame
starting with a proposal by Player 1 in state 1. Since (θ, A) has no
delay, Player 2 accepts θ1 and it holds that θ12 ≥ δ, since a rejection
by Player 2 leads to a breakdown with probability 1 − δ and a
transition to state 2 and a payoff of 1 for Player 2 with probability
δ. Similarly, it holds that θ13 ≥ δ, since a rejection by Player 3 leads
to a breakdown with probability 1 − δ and a transition to state 3
and a payoff of 1 for Player 3 with probability δ. It follows that
θ11 ≤ 1− θ12 − θ13 ≤ 1− 2δ < 0.
Since Player 1 can ensure a non-negative payoff by a strategy that
rejects all proposals, we have obtained a contradiction to (θ, A)
being an SSPE which has no delay. 
The intuition behind the example is the following. If Player 2
rejects the proposal of Player 1, then the game goes to an absorbing
statewhere Player 2 remains the proposer forever. It iswell-known
that in any SSPE of such a subgame, Player 2 would capture the
entire surplus. Thus, when the game is in state 1, Player 2 can
guarantee himself a payoff of δ by rejecting Player 1’s proposal.
In any SSPE with no delay, Player 1 would need to offer at least
the amount δ to Player 2. The same argument applies to Player 3:
If Player 3 rejects a proposal of Player 1, the game goes to an
absorbing state where Player 3 remains the proposer forever and
can capture the entire surplus. Thus, when Player 3 reacts to the
proposal of Player 1, he will not accept any less than δ. Indeed, the
sum of the responding players’ reservation payoffs is equal to 2δ.
We can see that if δ > 12 , then the available surplus is not sufficient
for Player 1 to pay the other two players their reservation payoffs.
Consequently, if δ > 12 , no agreement can be reached in state 1.
The next issue is whether there is an SSPE with delay in
Example 4.1 for δ > 1/2. Consider a strategy profile (θ¯ , A¯) with
proposals θ¯1 ∈ V , θ¯2 = (0, 1, 0), and θ¯3 = (0, 0, 1), and
acceptance sets
A¯1,s = {v ∈ V | v1 ≥ 0}, s = 1, 2, 3,
A¯2,1 = {v ∈ V | v2 ≥ δ, v3 ≥ δ},
A¯2,2 = {v ∈ V | v2 ≥ δ},A¯2,3 = {v ∈ V | v2 ≥ 0},
A¯3,s = {v ∈ V | v3 ≥ δ}, s = 1, 3,
A¯3,2 = {v ∈ V | v3 ≥ 0}.
When players play according to (θ¯ , A¯), Player 1 makes a
particular proposal belonging to V in state 1, whichwill be rejected
by some player when δ > 1/2. More precisely, the proposal θ¯1
in state 1 is rejected by Player 1 when θ¯11 < 0 and is rejected
by Player 2 otherwise. Notice that in state 1, Player 2 would even
reject the proposal (0, 1, 0), since acceptance of such a proposal
would lead to a rejection by Player 3, followed by breakdown of
the negotiations or a transition to state 3.
Consider first the case where θ¯11 < 0. Player 1 now rejects his
own proposal, negotiations break downwith probability 1− δ and
continue with probability δ. If negotiations continue, transitions
occur with equal probability to each of the three states, a rejection
of proposal θ¯1 by Player 1 in state 1, an acceptance of payoff vector
(0, 1, 0) in state 2, and an acceptance of payoff vector (0, 0, 1) in
state 3.
Consider next the situation where θ¯11 ≥ 0. Since θ¯11 ≥ 0 and
δ > 1/2, Player 2 rejects the proposal, negotiations break down
with probability 1−δ and continue in state 2 with probability δ. In
the latter case, the payoff vector (0, 1, 0) is proposed and accepted.
Proposition 4.3. For δ > 1/2, the strategy profile (θ¯ , A¯) is an SSPE
in Example 4.1.
Proof. To show that (θ¯ , A¯) is an SSPE, it suffices to verify the one-
shot deviation property, see for instance Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991). We consider three cases, depending on the state to which
a decision node belongs.
Case 1. Decision nodes in state 1.
After a history in state 1 where Player 1 has to propose, the
proposal θ¯1 is rejected, either by Player 1 in case θ¯11 < 0 or by
Player 2 in case θ¯11 ≥ 0, and leads ultimately to breakdown, or
the acceptance of proposal θ¯2, or the acceptance of proposal θ¯3. In
all cases, Player 1 receives a payoff of zero. A one-shot deviation
to any other proposal is rejected as well, either by Player 1 or by
Player 2, and also leads ultimately to a payoff of zero for sure. Such
a deviation is therefore not profitable.
After a history in state 1 where Player 1 has to respond, any
proposal vwith v1 < 0 is rejected by Player 1, and ultimately leads
to a payoff of zero for sure. A one-shot deviation to acceptance
leads to the acceptance of v and a negative payoff for Player 1, or
the rejection of v by Player 2 or Player 3 and a payoff of zero for
Player 1. Such a deviation is therefore not profitable. Any proposal
v with v1 ≥ 0 is accepted by Player 1, next rejected by Player 2,
and followed by breakdown of the negotiations or acceptance of
(0, 1, 0) in the next period. The payoff for Player 1 is therefore zero.
A one-shot deviation to rejection leads ultimately to a payoff of
zero for Player 1 as well and is therefore not profitable.
After a history in state 1 where Player 2 has to respond, any
proposal v with v2 < δ or v3 < δ is rejected by Player 2,
which results in a payoff of δ for Player 2. A one-shot deviation
to acceptance is followed by an acceptance by Player 3 if v3 ≥ δ
and leads to payoff v2 < δ for Player 2, so is not profitable, and is
followed by a rejection by Player 3 if v3 < δ, leading to payoff 0
for Player 2, so is not profitable either. Any proposal v with v2 ≥ δ
and v3 ≥ δ is accepted by Player 2, followed by an acceptance by
Player 3, and a payoff of v2 for Player 2. A one-shot deviation to
rejection leads to a payoff of δ ≤ v2 for Player 2 and is therefore
not profitable.
After a history in state 1 where Player 3 has to respond, any
proposal v with v3 < δ is rejected by Player 3, resulting in a payoff
of δ for Player 3. A one-shot deviation to acceptance is clearly not
profitable. Any proposal v with v3 ≥ δ is accepted by Player 3,
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rejection is clearly not profitable.
Case 2. Decision nodes in state 2.
After a history in state 2 where Player 2 has to propose, the
proposal θ¯2 = (0, 1, 0) by Player 2 is accepted by all players, and
leads to utility 1 for Player 2. Since Players 1 and 3 reject proposals
which give thema negative payoff, there are no profitable one-shot
deviations for Player 2. Since a one-shot rejection by any player
leads to payoffs (0, δ, 0), the one-shot deviation property holds for
responders.
Case 3. Decision nodes in state 3.
This case is similar to Case 2. 
Proposition 4.3 describes a continuum of SSPEs, parametrized
by the proposal θ¯1 by Player 1. For equilibria with θ¯11 < 0, the
equilibrium payoffs when starting in state 1 are equal to u(θ¯ , A¯ |
1) = (0, δ/(3− δ), δ/(3− δ)). For equilibria with θ¯11 ≥ 0, it holds
that u(θ¯ , A¯ | 1) = (0, δ, 0). None of the properties, apart from
SSPE existence, mentioned in Theorem 3.4 are satisfied. All SSPEs
have delay. There is a continuum of SSPEs where Player 1 makes
an inefficient proposal, and even if Player 1 makes an efficient
proposal, it is still rejected by Player 1 or Player 2. Any element of
V × {(0, 1, 0)} × {(0, 0, 1)} can be a limit equilibrium proposal, so
there is no unique limit equilibrium.When starting in state 1, limit
equilibrium utilities are either equal to (0, 1/2, 1/2) or (0, 0, 1).
Finally, limit equilibrium proposals are not equal to each other.
5. Robustness of Example 4.1
In this section,wewill examine the robustness of Example 4.1 to
perturbations of the transition probabilities. In particular, we will
see that the presence of absorbing states is not vital for equilibrium
delay, inefficient proposals, multiple limit equilibria, and limit
equilibrium proposals that are not equal to each other.
Indeed, one may object to Example 4.1 that states 2 and
3 are absorbing, no matter what actions the players take, and
therefore Assumption D is violated. Still, we would like to argue
that Example 4.1 is robust to perturbations in the transition
probabilities and that the violations of Properties 2, 3, 4, and 5
of Theorem 3.4 are not due to the presence of absorbing states.
Indeed, we will now present a perturbed version of Example 4.1
which satisfies Assumption D and show that nevertheless the
Properties 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Theorem 3.4 are violated. To be more
specific, consider the case where all the transition probabilities are
perturbed by some ε ∈ (0, 1/3). We obtain the following example.
Example 5.1. There are three players and three states, S = N =
{1, 2, 3}. Each player is the proposer in one state and players
respond in ascending order, so we have
ι(1) = (1, π0),
ι(2) = (2, π0),
ι(3) = (3, π0),
where π0 is the identity. Players have to divide a surplus of one
unit, V = {v ∈ R3|v1+v2+v3 ≤ 1}. In state s = 1, the transitions
depend on the identity of the player who rejects a proposal. If
Player 1 rejects his own proposal in state s = 1, then each of
the three states is selected next with equal probability. If Player
j = 2, 3 rejects the proposal by Player 1, then wemove to the state
inwhich j is proposer with probability 1−2ε. If we do not go to the
state in which player j proposes, then one of the other two states
is chosen randomly.
p1(1) =

1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3

,p2(1) = (ε, 1− 2ε, ε),
p3(1) = (ε, ε, 1− 2ε).
In states s = 2, 3, the transitions are independent of the identity
of the rejecting player. The process returns to the same state with
probability 1−2ε. The process continueswith probability ε in each
of the other two states.
pi(2) = (ε, 1− 2ε, ε), i ∈ N,
pi(3) = (ε, ε, 1− 2ε), i ∈ N. 
Notice that the transition dynamics in this example satisfy
Assumption D. In particular, each player is the proposer in one of
the three states. Moreover, the example is such that regardless of
the current state and the identity of the rejector, we move with
positive probability to every state after every rejection.
Consider a strategy profile (θˆ , Aˆ) with proposals θˆ1 ∈ {v ∈ V |
v1 < 0},
θˆ2 = (0, 1− y, y),
θˆ3 = (0, y, 1− y),
where
y = 3δε
(3− δ)(1− δ + 3δε) ,
and acceptance sets
Aˆ1,s = {v ∈ V | v1 ≥ 0}, s = 1, 2, 3,
Aˆ2,1 = {v ∈ V | v2 ≥ z, v3 ≥ z},
Aˆ2,2 = {v ∈ V | v2 ≥ z},
Aˆ2,3 = {v ∈ V | v2 ≥ y},
Aˆ3,s = {v ∈ V | v3 ≥ z}, s = 1, 3,
Aˆ3,2 = {v ∈ V | v3 ≥ y},
where
z = δ(1− δ)(3− δ − 9δε
2)+ δε(2− δ)(6δ − 3)
(3− δ)(1− δ + 3δε) .
Notice that if ε tends to zero, then y tends to zero and z to δ.
When players play according to (θˆ , Aˆ), Player 1 makes a
proposal θˆ1 in V with θˆ11 < 0 in state 1, which is rejected by
Player 1 himself, and a transition to each of the three states follows
with equal probability. In state 2, Player 2 makes a proposal that
gives a payoff of 0 to Player 1, gives the reservation payoff y to
Player 3, and keeps the remainder of the surplus himself. State 3 is
symmetric to state 2, with the roles of Players 2 and 3 reversed. The
proposals θˆ2 and θˆ3 in states 2 and 3 are accepted since 1− y > z,
which follows from the fact that
(3− δ)(1− δ)+ 3δε(2− δ) > δ(1− δ)(3− δ − 9δε2)
+ δε(2− δ)(6δ − 3).
Proposition 5.2. For every ε ∈ (0, 1/6), there exists δ¯ < 1 such that
for every δ ≥ δ¯ the strategy profile (θˆ , Aˆ) is an SSPE in Example 5.1.
Proof. For s = 1, 2, 3, we define the equilibrium utilities condi-
tional on state s, xs = u(θˆ , Aˆ | s). The symmetry of the game
and the strategies implies that x12 = x13, x21 = x31, x22 = x33, and
x23 = x32. It holds that x1 = (0, δ/(3 − δ), δ/(3 − δ)), x2 = θˆ2,
and x3 = θˆ3, where the expression for x1 uses the observation that
x12 = (δ/3)+ (δ/3)x12.
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property.We consider three cases, depending on the state towhich
a decision node belongs.
Case 1. Decision nodes in state 1.
Consider a history in state 1 after which Player 3 has to respond.
A rejection followed by play according to (θˆ , Aˆ) leads to a payoff
for Player 3 equal to δεx13+ δεx23+ δ(1− 2ε)x33. A straightforward,
but tedious, calculation reveals that this payoff is equal to z. Since
Player 3 accepts proposals in state 1 if and only if v3 ≥ z, this shows
that the one-shot deviation property is satisfied.
Consider a history in state 1 after which Player 2 has to respond
to a proposal v. Suppose first that v3 ≥ z. A calculation similar to
that in the previous paragraph shows that rejection of v by Player 2
yields a payoff of z. Acceptance of v by Player 2 leads to the payoff
v2 since v is also accepted by Player 3. We conclude that accepting
the proposal v if and only if v2 ≥ z does not violate the one-shot
deviation principle.
Suppose now that v3 < z. As before, rejecting v yields Player 2
a payoff of z. If Player 2 accepts v, it is rejected by Player 3, yielding
a continuation utility equal to δεx12+δεx22+δ(1−2ε)x32. A straight-
forward, though tedious, calculation reveals the latter expression
to be equal to y, and it holds that y < z since
z − y = δ(1− δ)(1− 3ε)(3− δ + 3δε)
(3− δ)(1− δ + 3δε) > 0.
Hence v should be rejected by Player 2.
The verification of the one-shot deviation property for Player 1
is trivial for histories where he responds. Consider a history where
Player 1 proposes. Player 1 has a profitable one-shot deviation if
and only if he can make a proposal that gives more than z to Play-
ers 2 and 3 and a positive payoff to himself. This implies that Player
1 has no profitable one-shot deviation if 2z ≥ 1. This inequality is
satisfied if and only if δ ≥ 1/(2 − 6ε). It follows that for every
ε ∈ (0, 1/6), there exists δ¯ < 1 such that for every δ ≥ δ¯, 2z ≥ 1.
Case 2. Decision nodes in state 2.
Player 3 accepts a proposal v if and only if v3 ≥ y, where y
equals the continuation payoff of Player 3 following his rejection.
This shows that the one-shot deviation property is satisfied.
Player 2 accepts a proposal v if and only if v2 ≥ z, where z
equals the continuation payoff of Player 2 following his rejection.
We observe that acceptance of v yields Player 2 payoff v2 if Player 3
accepts as well, and z if Player 3 rejects v. This shows that the one-
shot deviation property is satisfied.
The verification of the one-shot deviation property for Player 1
is trivial.
Consider a history in state 2 afterwhich Player 2 proposes. Since
the proposal θˆ2 of Player 2 gives Players 1 and 3 the least amount
they are willing to accept, there is no profitable one-shot deviation
for Player 2 which will be accepted by Players 1 and 3. Consider a
one-shot deviation by Player 2 which is rejected by some player.
Ultimately, such a proposal leads to breakdown and payoff 0 for
Player 2, or an acceptance of θˆ2 and payoff 1− y for Player 2 or an
acceptance of θˆ3 and Payoff y for Player 2. Since y < 1− y, the ex-
pected payoff for Player 2 is less than x22 = 1− y, so the deviation
is not profitable.
Case 3. Decision nodes in state 3.
By symmetry, the line of argument is the same as in Case 2. 
The equilibrium presented in Proposition 5.2 clearly violates
Properties 2 and 3 of Theorem 3.4: No agreement is reached in
state 1, and the proposal made in state 1 need not be efficient.
The equilibrium also has the remarkable feature that Player 1’s
equilibrium payoff is equal to zero in every state. This is surprising,
since in the framework of Britz et al. (2014), the bargainingpower of a player is proportional to the probability to propose
conditional on his own rejection. In the protocol of Example 5.1,
this probability is at least ε for Player 1. Proposition 5.2 also gives
us a multitude of limit equilibria, so that Properties 4 and 5 in
Theorem 3.4 are also violated. More specifically, we can see that
any point (θ1, θ2, θ3) where θ1 ∈ V with θ11 ≤ 0 and θ2 = θ3 =
(0, 12 ,
1
2 ) is a limit equilibrium.
Consider a strategy profile (θ˜ , A˜) with proposals θ˜1 ∈ {v ∈ V |
v1 ≥ 0},
θ˜2 = (0, 1− y3, y3),
θ˜3 = (0, y2, 1− y2),
where
y2 = δε + δ
2ε − 3δ2ε2
1− δ + 2δε + δ2ε − 3δ2ε2 ,
y3 = δε1− δ + 2δε + δ2ε − 3δ2ε2 ,
and acceptance sets
A˜1,s = {v ∈ V | v1 ≥ 0}, s = 1, 2, 3,
A˜2,1 = {v ∈ V | v2 ≥ z2, v3 ≥ z3},
A˜2,2 = {v ∈ V | v2 ≥ z2},
A˜2,3 = {v ∈ V | v2 ≥ y2},
A˜3,s = {v ∈ V | v3 ≥ z3}, s = 1, 3,
A˜3,2 = {v ∈ V | v3 ≥ y3},
where
z2 = δ − δ
2 − 2δε + 4δ2ε − 3δ2ε2
1− δ + 2δε + δ2ε − 3δ2ε2 ,
z3 = δ − δ
2 − 2δε + 3δ2ε
1− δ + 2δε + δ2ε − 3δ2ε2 .
Notice that if ε tends to zero, then y2 and y3 tend to zero and z2 and
z3 tend to δ.
When players play according to (θ˜ , A˜), Player 1 makes a
proposal θ˜1 in V with θ˜11 ≥ 0 in state 1. A straightforward
calculation shows that z2 + z3 > 1 if and only if
(1− δ)(2δ − 6δε − 1) > 0.
Therefore it holds that if ε < 1/6 and δ > 1/(2−6ε), then Player 2
rejects θ˜1, and a transition to state 2 follows with high probability.
In state 2, Player 2 makes a proposal that gives a payoff of 0 to
Player 1, gives the reservation payoff y2 to Player 3, and keeps the
remainder of the surplus himself. State 3 is similar, with the roles
of Players 2 and 3 reversed. The proposals θ˜2 and θ˜3 in states 2 and
3 are accepted since 1 − y3 ≥ z2 and 1 − y2 ≥ z3 which follows
respectively from
1− δ + δε + δ2ε − 3δ2ε2 > δ(1− δ)+ 2δ2ε − 3δ2ε2
> δ − δ2 − 2δε + 4δ2ε − 3δ2ε2,
1− δ + δε > δ − δ2 − 2δε + 3δ2ε.
Proposition 5.3. For every ε ∈ (0, 1/6), there exists δ¯ < 1 such that
for every δ ≥ δ¯ the strategy profile (θ˜ , A˜) is an SSPE in Example 5.1.
Proof. For s = 1, 2, 3, we define the equilibrium utilities condi-
tional on state s, xs = u(θ˜ , A˜ | s). We have that x2 = θ˜2, x3 = θ˜3,
x11 = 0, x12 = δεx12 + δ(1− 2ε)x22 + δεx32, so
x12 =
δ − δ2 − 2δε + 4δ2ε − 3δ2ε2
1− δ + 2δε + δ2ε − 3δ2ε2 ,
V. Britz et al. / Journal of Mathematical Economics 61 (2015) 192–202 199and x13 = δεx13 + δ(1− 2ε)x23 + δεx33, so
x13 =
δε
1− δ + 2δε + δ2ε − 3δ2ε2 .
To show that (θ˜ , A˜) is an SSPE, we verify the one-shot deviation
property.We consider three cases, depending on the state towhich
a decision node belongs.
Case 1. Decision nodes in state 1.
The following argument is analogous to the argument in the
proof of the previous proposition, except that z2, z3 now differ.
Consider a history in state 1 after which Player 3 has to respond.
A rejection followed by play according to (θ˜ , A˜) leads to a payoff for
Player 3 equal to δεx13 + δεx23 + δ(1 − 2ε)x33 = z3. Since Player 3
accepts proposals in state 1 if and only if v3 ≥ z3, this shows that
the one-shot deviation property is satisfied.
Consider a history in state 1 after which Player 2 has to respond
to a proposal v. Suppose first that v3 ≥ z3. A calculation similar to
that in the previous paragraph shows that rejection of v by Player
2 yields Player 2 a payoff of z2. Acceptance yields v2 because v is
accepted by Player 3. Hence accepting v if and only if v2 ≥ z2 does
not violate the one-shot deviation principle.
Suppose now that v3 < z3. As before, rejecting v by Player 2
gives payoff z2. If Player 2 accepts v, then it is rejected by Player 3
and yields δεx12 + δεx22 + δ(1 − 2ε)x32 = y2. It holds that y2 < z2
since
z2 − y2 = δ(1− δ)(1− 3ε)1− δ + 2δε + δ2ε − 3δ2ε2 > 0.
Thus rejecting v does not violate the one-shot deviation principle.
The verification of the one-shot deviation property for Player 1
is trivial for histories where he responds. We have already argued
that z2 + z3 > 1 if δ > 1/(2 − 6ε). For such values of δ, Player 1
cannot make a profitable one-shot deviation as a proposer.
Case 2. Decision nodes in state 2.
Using the same argument as in the proof of the previous
proposition, we can show that the one-shot deviation property is
satisfied.
Consider a history in state 2 afterwhich Player 2 proposes. Since
the proposal θ˜2 of Player 2 gives Players 1 and 3 the least amount
they are willing to accept, there is no profitable one-shot deviation
for Player 2 which will be accepted by Players 1 and 3. Consider a
one-shot deviation by Player 2 which is rejected by some player.
Ultimately, such a proposal leads to breakdown and payoff 0 for
Player 2, or an acceptance of θ˜2 and payoff 1− y3 for Player 2 or an
acceptance of θ˜3 and Payoff y2 for Player 2. Since it is easily verified
that y2 < 1 − y3, the expected payoff for Player 2 is less than
x22 = 1− y3, so the deviation is not profitable.
Case 3. Decision nodes in state 3.
This case is analogous to the Case 2. 
Notice that the strategy profile (θ˜ , A˜) violates no delay and
efficient proposals which are two of the properties listed in
Theorem 3.4. This is because there is no agreement in state
1, and because the proposal θ˜1, which is indeterminate, may
be inefficient. Proposition 5.3 yields limit equilibria of the form
(θ1, θ2, θ3)where θ1 ∈ V with θ11 ≥ 0 and
θ2 = θ3 =

0,
2− 3ε
3− 3ε ,
1
3− 3ε

.
Clearly, not all players make the same proposals in the limit. The
fact that in both cases Players 2 and 3 do make the same propos-
als in the limit can be deduced from Theorem 3.4. Indeed, since
Player 1’s proposal is rejected, one can view the resulting system,
involving Players 2 and 3 only, as an exogenous protocol.6. Non-existence of SSPEs
In the examples of the previous two sections, all properties of
Theorem 3.4 are violated, with the exception of the existence of an
SSPE. In this section, we will present an example where no SSPE
exists at all, neither one with immediate agreement, nor one with
delay. The onlymodificationwhen compared to Example 4.1 is that
in state 1, after a rejection by Player 2 or 3, we follow the rejector-
proposes protocol with probability 1/2 and return to state 1 with
the complementary probability.
Example 6.1. There are three players and three states, S = N =
{1, 2, 3}. Each player is the proposer in one state and players
respond in ascending order, so we have
ι(1) = (1, π0),
ι(2) = (2, π0),
ι(3) = (3, π0),
where π0 is the identity. Players have to divide a surplus of one
unit, V = {v ∈ R3 | v1+v2+v3 ≤ 1}. In state s = 1, the transitions
depend on the identity of the player who rejects a proposal,
p1(1) =

1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3

,
p2(1) =

1
2
,
1
2
, 0

,
p3(1) =

1
2
, 0,
1
2

.
States s = 2, 3 are absorbing.
pi(2) = (0, 1, 0) , i ∈ N,
pi(3) = (0, 0, 1) , i ∈ N. 
Proposition 6.2. For δ ∈ (2/3, 3/4), there is no SSPE in Example6.1.
Proof. Suppose (θ, A) is an SSPE. It clearly holds that θ2 =
(0, 1, 0) and θ3 = (0, 0, 1). Now let x = u(θ, A | 1) be the
equilibrium utilities conditional on state 1 and let z i be the vector
of continuation payoffs after a proposal in state 1 is rejected by
Player i. We have
z1 = δ
3
x+ δ
3
(0, 1, 0)+ δ
3
(0, 0, 1),
z2 = δ
2
x+ δ
2
(0, 1, 0),
z3 = δ
2
x+ δ
2
(0, 0, 1).
We distinguish four possible cases.
Case 1. θ1 is accepted by Players 1, 2, and 3.
In this case it holds that x = θ1. Since all players accept θ1, we
have
x1 ≥ z11 =
δ
3
x1,
x2 ≥ z22 =
δ
2
x2 + δ2 ,
x3 ≥ z33 =
δ
2
x3 + δ2 .
This gives the inequalities x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ δ/(2 − δ), and x3 ≥
δ/(2−δ), whereas at the same time x1+x2+x3 = θ11+θ12+θ13 ≤ 1.
For δ > 2/3, we have a contradiction.
Case 2. θ1 is accepted by Players 1 and 2, and rejected by Player 3.
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z32 = (δ/2)x2. Since δ/2 < 1, it follows that z32 = x2 = 0.
But Player 2 accepts, so it must hold that z32 = 0 ≥ z22 = δ/2,
contradicting that δ is strictly positive.
Case 3. θ1 is accepted by Player 1 and rejected by Player 2.
Since Player 2 rejects θ1, we have x = z2, from which it follows
that x = (0, δ/(2 − δ), 0) and in particular that z22 = δ/(2 − δ).
Plugging x1 = 0 into the equation for z1 and x3 = 0 into the
equation for z3 gives z11 = 0 and z33 = δ/2, respectively. Since
z11 + z22 + z33 = 0 + δ/2 + δ/(2 − δ) < 1 if δ < 3/4, there exists
a proposal v ∈ V such that v ≫ (z11 , z22 , z33). Clearly, v would be
accepted by all players. Since v1 > x1 = 0, proposing v instead of
θ1 would be a profitable deviation for Player 1.
Case 4. θ1 is rejected by Player 1.
If Player 1 rejects his own proposal, then x = z1, so x =
(0, δ/(3 − δ), δ/(3 − δ)), and in particular z11 = 0. Plugging the
expression for x into the equations for z2 and z3, we find that
z22 = z33 = 3δ/(6 − 2δ). Given that δ < 3/4, we have that
z11 + z22 + z33 < 1, thus there exists a proposal v ∈ V such that
v ≫ (z11 , z22 , z33). The proposal v would be accepted unanimously.
Since v1 > x1 = 0, it would be a profitable deviation for Player 1
to propose v instead of θ1. 
7. Robustness of Example 6.1
In this section, we will examine the robustness of Example 6.1
to perturbations of the transition probabilities. In particular, we
demonstrate that the presence of absorbing states is not crucial for
the lack of SSPEs. Consider Example 6.1 and perturb all transition
probabilities by ε ∈ [0, 1/3). We obtain the following example.
Example 7.1. There are three players and three states, S = N =
{1, 2, 3}. Each player is the proposer in one state and players
respond in ascending order, so we have
ι(1) = (1, π0),
ι(2) = (2, π0),
ι(3) = (3, π0),
where π0 is the identity. Players have to divide a surplus of one
unit, V = {v ∈ R3 | v1+v2+v3 ≤ 1}. In state s = 1, the transitions
depend on the identity of the player who rejects a proposal,
p1(1) =

1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3

,
p2(1) =

1
2
− ε
2
,
1
2
− ε
2
, ε

,
p3(1) =

1
2
− ε
2
, ε,
1
2
− ε
2

.
States s = 2, 3 are ‘‘almost absorbing’’, there is a small strictly
positive probability to leave these states.
pi(2) = (ε, 1− 2ε, ε) , i ∈ N,
pi(3) = (ε, ε, 1− 2ε) , i ∈ N. 
Clearly, Example 7.1 satisfies the strong regularity conditions of
Assumption D.
Proposition 7.2. For every δ ∈ (2/3, 3/4), there exists ε¯ > 0 such
that for every ε ∈ [0, ε¯] there is no SSPE in Example 7.1.
Proof. Suppose (θ, A) is an SSPE. Let x = u(θ, A | 1) be
the equilibrium utilities conditional on state 1 and let z i be thevector of continuation payoffs after a proposal in state 1 is rejected
by Player i.
We argue first that the proposals θ2 and θ3 are going to be
accepted. Suppose, to the contrary, that θ2 is rejected. Since tran-
sition probabilities in state 2 do not depend on the identity of the
rejector,we find that the vector of continuation payoffs conditional
on the rejection by a player in state 2, say y, is independent of the
identity of the rejecting player. Moreover, since negotiations break
down with probability 1 − δ, it holds thati∈N yi ≤ δ. Player 2
can therefore make a proposal giving every player a payoff strictly
above his continuation payoff following a rejection. Such a pro-
posal would be accepted, so Player 2 has a profitable deviation,
which leads to a contradiction. Consequently, θ2 is going to be ac-
cepted. Using exactly the same argument, it follows that θ3 is going
to be accepted.
We have
z1 = δ
3
x+ δ
3
θ2 + δ
3
θ3,
z2 = δ − δε
2
x+ δ − δε
2
θ2 + δεθ3,
z3 = δ − δε
2
x+ δεθ2 + δ − δε
2
θ3.
The continuation payoff of Player 3 conditional on his rejection in
state 2 is equal to δ(1 − 2ε)θ23 + δε(x3 + θ33 ). Player 3 therefore
accepts any proposal giving a strictly higher payoff. Since Player 2
should not have a profitable deviation, we find that
θ23 = δ(1− 2ε)θ23 + δε(x3 + θ33 ).
By rearranging terms, we find that
θ23 =
δε(x3 + θ33 )
1− δ + 2δε ≤
2δε
1− δ + 2δε .
By a similar argument, we find that
θ21 =
δε(x1 + θ31 )
1− δ + 2δε ≤
2δε
1− δ + 2δε .
We can apply the same reasoning in state 3, to obtain
θ31 ≤
2δε
1− δ + 2δε ,
θ32 ≤
2δε
1− δ + 2δε ,
and it follows that
θ22 ≥
1− δ − 2δε
1− δ + 2δε ,
θ33 ≥
1− δ − 2δε
1− δ + 2δε .
Let some δ ∈ (2/3, 3/4) be given. We distinguish four cases.
Case 1. θ1 is accepted by Players 1, 2, and 3.
In this case x = θ1. Since all players accept θ1, we have
x1 ≥ z11 ≥
δ
3
x1,
x2 ≥ z22 ≥
δ − δε
2
x2 + δ − δε2 θ
2
2 ≥
δ − δε
2
x2
+ δ − δε
2
1− δ − 2δε
1− δ + 2δε ,
x3 ≥ z33 ≥
δ − δε
2
x3 + δ − δε2 θ
3
3 ≥
δ − δε
2
x3
+ δ − δε
2
1− δ − 2δε
1− δ + 2δε .
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x1 ≥ 0,
x2 ≥ δ − δε2− δ + δε
1− δ − 2δε
1− δ + 2δε ,
x3 ≥ δ − δε2− δ + δε
1− δ − 2δε
1− δ + 2δε ,
so
x1 + x2 + x3 ≥ 2δ − 2δε2− δ + δε
1− δ − 2δε
1− δ + 2δε . (1)
If we evaluate the right-hand side of (1) at ε = 0, we find it to be
equal to 2δ/(2− δ), which is strictly above 1 since δ ∈ (2/3, 3/4).
Since the right-hand side of (1) is continuous in ε, there is ε¯1 > 0
such that for every ε ∈ [0, ε¯1) it holds that the expression in (1)
is strictly above 1. At the same time it holds that x1 + x2 + x3 =
θ11 + θ12 + θ13 ≤ 1, so we have a contradiction.
Case 2. θ1 is accepted by Players 1 and 2, and rejected by Player 3.
Since Player 3 rejects θ1, we have
x2 = z32 =
δ − δε
2
x2 + δεθ22 +
δ − δε
2
θ32 .
By rearranging terms, we find that
z32 =
2δε
2− δ + δε θ
2
2 +
δ − δε
2− δ + δε θ
3
2
≤ 2δε
2− δ + δε +
δ − δε
2− δ + δε
2δε
1− δ + 2δε . (2)
Since Player 2 accepts θ1, it holds that
z32 ≥ z22 =
δ − δε
2
x2 + δ − δε2 θ
2
2 + δεθ32
≥ δ − δε
2
1− δ − 2δε
1− δ + 2δε . (3)
Evaluating (2) and (3) at ε = 0, we find that z32 = 0 and z22 =
δ/2 > 1/3, a contradiction to z32 ≥ z22 . Since the expressions in (2)
and (3) are continuous in ε, there is ε¯2 > 0 such that we obtain the
same contradiction for every ε ∈ [0, ε¯2].
Case 3. θ1 is accepted by Player 1 and rejected by Player 2.
Since Player 2 rejects θ1, we have
x = z2 = δ − δε
2
x+ δ − δε
2
θ2 + δεθ3,
so
x1 = z21 =
δ − δε
2− δ + δε θ
2
1 +
2δε
2− δ + δε θ
3
1
≤ δ + δε
2− δ + δε
2δε
1− δ + 2δε ,
x2 = z22 =
δ − δε
2− δ + δε θ
2
2 +
2δε
2− δ + δε θ
3
2
≤ δ − δε
2− δ + δε +
2δε
2− δ + δε
2δε
1− δ + 2δε ,
x3 = z23 =
δ − δε
2− δ + δε θ
2
3 +
2δε
2− δ + δε θ
3
3
≤ δ − δε
2− δ + δε
2δε
1− δ + 2δε +
2δε
2− δ + δε .
We use these expressions to obtain
z11 =
δ
3
x1 + δ3θ
2
1 +
δ
3
θ31 ≤
δ
3
δ + δε
2− δ + δε
2δε
1− δ + 2δε
+ δ
3
4δε
1− δ + 2δε ,z33 =
δ − δε
2
x3 + δεθ23 +
δ − δε
2
θ33 ≤
δ − δε
2
δ − δε
2− δ + δε
× 2δε
1− δ + 2δε +
δ − δε
2
2δε
2− δ + δε
+ δε 2δε
1− δ + 2δε +
δ − δε
2
.
Evaluating the upper bounds for x1, z11 , z
2
2 , and z
3
3 at ε = 0 gives
values equal to 0, 0, δ/(2 − δ), and δ/2, respectively, so an upper
bound for z11+z22+z33 is given by δ/(2−δ)+δ/2 < 39/40 since δ <
3/4. Since the expressions for the upper bounds on x1, z11 , z
2
2 , and
z33 are continuous in ε, there is ε¯3 > 0 such that for every ε ∈ [0, ε¯3]
it holds that x1 < 1/40 and z11 + z22 + z33 < 39/40. For these values
of ε there exists a proposal v ∈ V such that v1 ≥ 1/40 and v ≫
(z11 , z
2
2 , z
3
3). Such a proposal v would be accepted unanimously and
satisfies v1 > x1, so would be a profitable deviation for Player 1.
Case 4. θ1 is rejected by Player 1.
If Player 1 rejects his own proposal, then
x = z1 = δ
3
x+ δ
3
θ2 + δ
3
θ3,
so
x1 = z11 =
δ
3− δ θ
2
1 +
δ
3− δ θ
3
1 ≤
δ
3− δ
4δε
1− δ + 2δε ,
x2 = z12 =
δ
3− δ θ
2
2 +
δ
3− δ θ
3
2 ≤
δ
3− δ +
δ
3− δ
2δε
1− δ + 2δε ,
x3 = z13 =
δ
3− δ θ
2
3 +
δ
3− δ θ
3
3 ≤
δ
3− δ
2δε
1− δ + 2δε +
δ
3− δ .
It now follows that
z22 =
δ − δε
2
x2 + δ − δε2 θ
2
2 + δεθ32 ≤
δ − δε
2
δ
3− δ
+ δ − δε
2
δ
3− δ
2δε
1− δ + 2δε +
δ − δε
2
+ δε 2δε
1− δ + 2δε ,
z33 =
δ − δε
2
x3 + δεθ23 +
δ − δε
2
θ33
≤ δ − δε
2
δ
3− δ
2δε
1− δ + 2δε +
δ − δε
2
δ
3− δ
+ δε 2δε
1− δ + 2δε +
δ − δε
2
.
Evaluating the upper bounds for z11 , z
2
2 , and z
3
3 at ε = 0 gives values
equal to 0, 3δ/(6−2δ), and 3δ/(6−2δ), respectively, so an upper
bound for z11 + z22 + z33 is given by 6δ/(6− 2δ) < 1 since δ < 3/4.
Since the expressions for the upper bounds on z11 , z
2
2 , and z
3
3 are
continuous in ε, there is ε¯4 > 0 such that for every ε ∈ [0, ε¯4] it
holds that z11+ z22+ z33 < 1. For these values of ε there exists a pro-
posal v ∈ V such that v ≫ (z11 , z22 , z33). Such a proposal v would
be accepted unanimously and satisfies v1 > z11 = x1, so would be
a profitable deviation for Player 1.
For ε¯ = min{ε¯1, ε¯2, ε¯3, ε¯4} > 0, for every ε ≤ ε¯, there is no
SSPE in Example 7.1. 
8. Coalitional bargaining
An interesting direction for future research concerns the ex-
tension of our analysis to the framework of coalitional bargain-
ing. The simplest set-up would be the one of transferable utility
games, where any coalition can generate some surplus. Chatterjee
et al. (1993) consider the rejector-proposes protocol for this frame-
work and give examples to show that SSPE may exhibit delay and
may fail to have efficient proposals. They show that strict convex-
ity of the transferable utility game is sufficient to get convergence
to the egalitarian allocation of Dutta and Ray (1989) if the com-
mon discount factor converges to one. Kawamori (2008) studies
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new proposer, conditional on who rejects the current proposal. It
is shown that the possibility of the existence of an SSPE with effi-
cient proposals decreases as the probability that the rejector in the
preceding round becomes the proposer increases.
Okada (1996) considers the protocol with time-invariant
uniform recognition probabilities and shows that an SSPE does not
exhibit delay if the transferable utility game is superadditive. To
obtain an SSPE with efficient proposals, the grand coalition should
have the largest per capita value among all coalitions. Moreover,
under this condition, as the common discount factor goes to one,
the value of the grand coalition is divided equally among the
players.
Compte and Jehiel (2010) and Okada (2011) show how the use
of mixed strategies leads to a general SSPE existence result. For
the protocolwith time-invariant uniform recognition probabilities,
Compte and Jehiel (2010) provide both necessary and sufficient
conditions, which are stronger than non-emptiness of the core, to
get convergence to the coalitional Nash bargaining solution if at
most one coalition can actually form.
9. Conclusion
We consider bargaining games of perfect information with a
unanimous acceptance rule. The focus of the analysis is on the
influence of the bargaining protocol on the bargaining outcomes.
We consider a framework where the proposer and the order of
the responding players is determined by a state variable. The
probability distribution over states in the following period is
determined jointly by the current state and the identity of the
player who rejected the previous proposal.
Many papers in the existing literature are incorporated as
special cases of this framework. It is either assumed that the
identity of the future proposer only depends on the identity of
the current proposer or it is assumed that it only depends on the
identity of the rejector. In both cases it holds that SSPEs exist,
have the immediate acceptance property, and involve efficient
proposals only. Asymptotically, as players become perfectly
patient, all such equilibria converge to an appropriately defined
asymmetric Nash bargaining solution.
In this paper, however, we show that these conclusions do not
carry over to the general framework: SSPEs need not exist. When
they do exist, they may exhibit delay and involve inefficient pro-
posals. The limit equilibrium need not be unique, limit equilibrium
utilities need not be unique, and players may make different equi-
librium proposals in the limit.
The central message in Britz et al. (2014) is that the bargaining
power of a player is determined by the probability to propose
conditional on his own rejection. For the more general framework
considered here, we show that even though players can proposewith positive probability conditional on their own rejection, they
might still have no bargaining power at all.
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